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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 A number of important procedural decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have 
had a dramatic impact on plaintiffs’ access to the federal courts, their right to a jury 
trial, and even the substantive law of employment discrimination. The first cases 
involved the so-called “summary judgment trilogy,”1 then Iqbal2 and Twombly3 
dealing with motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),4 and 
most recently Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes5 addressing class certification. In theory, 
these decisions were “only procedural,” either addressing preliminary matters at a 
relatively early stage of the case or, at the very least, before the merits of the case had 
been litigated.
 But this characterization—“only procedural”—dramatically understates the 
significance of these decisions. The impact of these cases stretches beyond the usual 
one affecting the court’s evaluation of the complaint or its determination of summary 
judgment or class certification. Typically, these rulings can end a case, or dramatically 
reshape it. Threshold determinations have always required a court to make substantive 
predictions about the merits of the plaintiff ’s case. Indeed, early rulings on procedural 
issues, such as dismissal motions and summary judgment, have often comprised an 
effective revision of substantive law through the back door.
 The cases we discuss here, however, have gone much further: more and more the 
Supreme Court is inviting—even encouraging—trial courts to evaluate the merits of the 
case on the basis of limited, even skewed, information long before the plaintiff has had 
an opportunity for discovery. As a result, more and more courts are weighing evidence, 
evaluating the credibility of claims and witnesses, and substituting their normative 
judgments for a jury’s determination. Not only are factual determinations affected by 
the new “procedural standards,” but, more significantly, the law is also affected.
 Our interest in this issue was piqued by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Wal-Mart, where, in the course of ruling on the procedural issue of “commonality” 
for class certification purposes, the Court effectively reinterpreted and dramatically 
narrowed the substantive law of gender discrimination and equal pay. First, the 
Court conflated Rule 23(a)’s simple question—are there common questions of law 
and fact—with Rule 23(b)’s more complex one—how common are those common 
questions and do they predominate over issues in the individual cases. The answer to 
the first question, at least under the then-existing standards, was clear: there were 
plainly questions common to the plaintiff class, even if the Court ultimately rejected 
class status under Rule 23(b). But, the second finding, that the case failed the 
“commonality” prong of Rule 23(a) because of a failure of plaintiffs’ proof, was an 
1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). All rules referenced throughout this essay are to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless otherwise noted.
5. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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extraordinary conclusion at the class certification stage. The plaintiffs, the majority 
held, could show no “general policy” of discrimination, as if redressing discrimination 
in the twenty-first century is about ferreting out overt discrimination, the offending 
policy, or the explicit discriminator. While class certification cases may pose special 
opportunities to confuse procedure and substance, we want to brief ly explore this 
problem in other preliminary procedural contexts as well.
 This essay examines the substantive law dimensions of Iqbal and Twombly, 
particularly in employment discrimination cases. In both cases, the Court transformed 
a relatively cursory evaluation appropriate for a preliminary stage of the litigation, 
namely, whether any set of facts could support the allegations in a complaint, into a 
more searching inquiry about whether those allegations were “plausible.” We predict 
that the discrimination complaints that count as “plausible” under this new framework 
are likely to be influenced by the same biases that were present in Wal-Mart—cases 
with the “smoking gun” of discriminatory policies. We consider these issues from our 
different vantage points as an academic and a former federal judge, both involved for 
many years in civil rights and employment discrimination litigation in different 
settings. We share a concern about how substantive law on discrimination can be 
shaped, misinterpreted, and misread in many of these “only procedural” rulings.
 We begin in Part II with a brief discussion of Wal-Mart to illustrate how these 
preliminary procedural decisions have implications for substantive law. We then 
examine in Part III how Twombly and Iqbal have affected the substantive law 
dimensions of Rule 12(b)(6) decisions in general, and in Part IV, we consider the 
special problems that Iqbal and Twombly pose in employment discrimination cases in 
particular. Finally, in Part V, we conclude with some general lessons to be drawn 
from seeing “substance” in preliminary procedural decisions, the implications of this 
inquiry for federal civil litigation, and raise questions for further exploration.
ii. thE sUbstAntiVE LAW diMEnsiOns Of prOcEdUrAL dEcisiOns: WaL-Mart
 Wal-Mart, the largest employment discrimination case in the United States 
raising Equal Pay Act claims,6 was brought as a class action. The class certification 
issues were litigated after three years of extensive pre-certification discovery, 
including expert testimony. The evidence showed that Wal-Mart enabled supervisors 
to set pay within a range of about $2 an hour and, further, that supervisors exercised 
that discretion in such a way as to pay women less than similarly situated men.7 In 
addition, store managers would decide on promotions by choosing an individual 
employee, rather than following a rational, uniform process in which all employees 
could participate.8 The bottom line was that men were regularly promoted over 
similarly situated women, and, in some cases, they were men with weaker credentials.
6. See, e.g., Joan Biskupik, Supreme Court Limits Wal-Mart Sex Discrimination Case, USA Today (June 26, 
2011, 9:24 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2011-06-20-walmart-sex-
bias-case_n.htm.
7. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146–47 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
8. Id. at 148–49.
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 The Supreme Court ruled that because of the subjective nature of Wal-Mart’s pay 
decisions and the lack of a centralized policy, there was insufficient commonality of the 
plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 23(a) to qualify for class action treatment. The Court 
summarily rejected the extensive expert testimony, the affidavits of 120 employees, and 
other data. Gender disparities that were consistent across the individual discretionary 
decisions of supervisors were found to be insufficient to establish commonality. Rather, 
the Court seemed to suggest that Wal-Mart had to have an explicit policy of gender 
discrimination for the plaintiffs to qualify for class action treatment, in effect a 
“smoking gun” or an identifiable practice, like a testing requirement, that resulted in 
disparate treatment.9 The requirement of an explicit or common policy is fundamentally 
inconsistent with employment discrimination law to date, let alone the real problems of 
discrimination in the twenty-first century marketplace.
 Many commentators have been critical of Wal-Mart.10 But one aspect of the case 
that has been less examined is the significance of this commonality ruling on the 
merits analysis. Preliminary rulings can have many impacts: they can establish the law 
of the case, encourage settlement, frame discovery, etc. If the case does not go forward 
as a class action, it may well be over; in some cases, Wal-Mart among them, individual 
cases will be too small to be individually pursued. But the Court’s ruling on 
commonality and its implications for equal pay law may also shape other cases—not 
only potential class actions, but also the run-of-the-mill individual discrimination case.
 Significantly, a threshold issue in the appeal in Wal-Mart was the scope of the 
class certification determination. Plaintiffs argued that the motion was simply a 
preliminary determination of whether there was any “common issue” under the 
“commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a). The defendant claimed that the class 
certification motion went more directly to “the merits” of the case or, as Justice 
Ginsburg noted, asked not simply whether there were any common questions of law 
9. The Court rejected the testimony of Dr. William Bielby showing how the kinds of policies adopted by 
Wal-Mart made the company vulnerable to bias. While Dr. Bielby could show the risks of those practices, 
he could not say what percentage of Wal-Mart’s decisions were determined by stereotyped thinking. To 
the Court’s majority, “[i]f Bielby admittedly has no answer to that question [the precise number of decisions 
affected by stereotyped thinking], we can safely disregard what he has to say. It is worlds away from 
significant proof that Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2563 (emphasis added). Testimony like that from Dr. Bielby had become commonplace in so called “second 
generation” discrimination cases. Melissa Hart & Paul Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework 
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 41 (2009) (“Social framework 
testimony has become a central element of many employment discrimination disputes over the past two 
decades. In these cases, a plaintiff or plaintiffs typically will put forward a social psychologist or expert in 
organizational behavior to testify about the widespread incidence of stereotypes and bias, and to identify 
within the challenged workplace those policies that tend to permit or to discourage operation of such 
bias.”). Indeed, Dr. Bielby’s testimony was virtually identical to the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, which 
the Supreme Court had credited in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989). See Martha 
Chamallas, Of Glass Ceilings, Sex Stereotypes, and Mixed Motives: The Story of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
in Women and the Law Stories (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011).
10. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 73 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
New Limits on Class Actions, Trial, Nov. 2011, at 54, available at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/
justice/hs.xsl/16997.htm.
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or fact, the first question of Rule 23(a), but also how common the law-fact questions 
were, the standard of Rule 23(b).11 The majority of the Court accepted Wal-Mart’s 
approach and evaluated “commonality” in such a way as to conf late 23(a)’s 
commonality prong and 23(b)’s evaluation of whether the common questions 
predominated. And they did so in the context of the extensive evidence that had 
been amassed for class certification purposes. In the light of that record, the majority’s 
findings not only raised the bar for class action treatment, but also effectively 
recharacterized gender law in the workplace. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion suggests 
that a discretionary decisionmaking process plus evidence of an adverse impact is not 
enough as a matter of substantive law to qualify for class action treatment and, by 
implication, not enough to prove discrimination at all.
 Wal-Mart runs the risk of reversing many years of rulings on gender discrimination 
that emphasized the complexity and the nuanced nature of discrimination, rulings 
that demonstrated that discrimination does not involve only the explicit policy or the 
obviously biased decisionmaker. While there was a narrow basis on which to rule—
notably, Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion that there were common issues but they did 
not predominate given the extraordinary, nationwide scope of the case—the majority 
chose to sweep much more broadly. The result was dramatic: a decision that was a 
preliminary one in the context of the litigation, but hardly “only procedural.”12
11. Citing to Arthur Miller, the amicus brief noted that the “23(a)(2) commonality requirement is a ‘simple, 
low level’ requirement that there be either one significant common issue or several common issues. It is 
a standard that is ‘relatively easy to satisfy.’” Brief for Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, at 6, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277). 
Indeed, before Wal-Mart, courts have uniformly held that determinations of fact on certification are not 
binding on the merits of the litigation at all. Id. at 8. Courts have also held that the commonality prong 
is analytically distinct from the predominance question, which requires a closer analysis. Id. at 13.
12. The impact of Wal-Mart could be seen almost immediately. In Barrett v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 
No. 08-10157-RWZ (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2012), Judge Zobel decertified a class based exclusively on the 
authority of Wal-Mart. The class had been composed of African American borrowers who had obtained 
mortgage loans from one of the defendants within a certain amount of time. They claimed that Option 
One’s pricing policy, by granting brokers discretion to set higher rates, resulted in a disparate impact on 
African American borrowers, a claim supported by the report of Professor Ian Ayres of Yale Law 
School. Class Certification Report of Ian Ayers, Barrett. v. Option One Mortgage Corp., No. 08-10157-
RWZ (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2012). He concluded that, controlling for all legitimate risk factors that 
might affect the cost of the loan, the rates paid by the class were higher than those paid by similarly 
situated white borrowers, averaging $134 more per year. Id. at 7.
  According to Judge Zobel, under Wal-Mart, this showing was no longer sufficient to establish 
commonality. The plaintiffs had to show a “common mode of exercising discretion” at the level of “each 
individual broker.” Id. at 5, 8. And “aggregate, nationwide statistics” are not the way to accomplish that 
proof. Id.
  In effect, the decision suggests that the only way of demonstrating a “common mode of exercising 
discretion,” would be with explicitly discriminatory policies. Simply having unfettered discretion, and 
systematically exercising that discretion to the disadvantage of African Americans, is not enough. Cf. 
Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss 
on a complaint alleging that the net effect of Countrywide’s discretionary pricing policy disadvantaged 
African American homeowners; white homeowners with identical or similar credit scores pay different 
rates because of a policy that enables racial bias to play a part in the pricing scheme).
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iii.  thE sUbstantiVE LaW diMEnsiOns Of prOCEdUraL dECisiOns UndEr 
iQbaL and tWOMbLY
 The traditional structure of the federal civil lawsuit under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure required the resolution of preliminary procedural matters at the 
outset so that the case can be decided later on the merits under the substantive law.13 
Rule 12(b) motions set out some of these threshold matters: personal jurisdiction, 
venue, and the failure to state a claim. Rule 23 outlines the requirements for class 
certification. Other preliminary proceedings, like motions in limine under Rule 702, 
frame the requirements for the admissibility of scientific or other expert evidence.14
 However, as in Wal-Mart, these rulings may be linked to merits issues in a 
number of ways.15 Clearly, they may be outcome determinative, signaling the end of 
the litigation. They may shape the parties’ ability to present their case by affecting 
the scope of discovery and their access to information. Rulings on the admissibility 
or inadmissibility of expert testimony under Daubert16 may foreordain the result on 
summary judgment. In Wal-Mart, the Court’s decision meant that the case could not 
be pursued as a class action, which, as a practical matter, meant it would not likely be 
pursued at all.
 In addition, in order to address the legal requirements of these procedural issues, 
judges must often determine or preview substantive law questions that the judge will 
have to reach to decide the merits of the case. For example, a decision on venue may 
determine not only who the decisionmaker will be, but “where the claim arose,” a 
substantive law issue that is intertwined with the merits of the claim. And in Wal-
Mart, the Court’s decision on commonality for Rule 23 purposes revised gender and 
equal pay discrimination law in a “back door” way as dicta.
 Until 2007, modern pleading rules described the standards for evaluating 
complaints as the standard of “notice pleading.” Under Conley v. Gibson,17 dismissals 
under Rule 12(b)(6) required that when considering whether a pleading states a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, courts must “accept as true all of the factual 
allegations contained in the complaint.”18 In effect, the litigation was supposed to 
continue even if the plaintiff ’s allegations did not seem credible to the judge or were 
unlikely to be proven. The standard was a forgiving one, in contrast to the ponderous 
13. In this essay, we are examining the substantive law dimensions of procedural rulings. In a sense, it is the 
opposite of the inquiry posed in Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 801 (2010) (exploring the procedural aspects of substantive law claims). A fuller 
discussion of the procedure/substance dichotomy in its various manifestations throughout the law of 
civil procedure is beyond the scope of this essay. However, many others have suggested, as we do here, 
that procedural rules can be “a surrogate for substantive law revision.” Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural 
Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revisions, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 827 (1993).
14. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
15. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1301 (2012) (describing the impact on the merits of “effects-test” cases in personal jurisdiction).
16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
17. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
18. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002).
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pleading system it replaced. The goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
clear: “[to] reshape[] civil litigation to ref lect core values of citizen access to the 
justice system and adjudication on the merits based on a full disclosure of relevant 
information.”19 Conley recognized that a motion to dismiss involved a very preliminary 
review, long before discovery, and, further, a standard that appropriately limited the 
extent to which a judge’s predilections, or worse, biases, would intrude into the 
threshold decisionmaking process.
 All that changed with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and later Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 
With Twombly, the Court underscored that the governing approach was whether the 
allegations were “plausible,” that the plain statement “possess enough heft ‘to sho[w] 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”20 In order to avoid falling “short of the line 
between possibility and plausibility,” complaints must have “further factual 
enhancement.”21 In Iqbal, the Court reiterated the “plausibility standard” and held 
that the evaluation of the plausibility of complaints was a “context-specific” task in 
which judges were to “draw on [their] judicial experience and common sense.”22 The 
enterprise now involved more than determining whether the pleadings were 
“consistent with” liability,23 an approach that required nothing more than a rational 
examination of the complaint, measuring the factual allegations against the legal 
claims to see if they fit. Rather, now the judge was to ask whether alternative 
explanations for the events complained of are “more likely” than the allegations made 
by the plaintiff, effectively a probabilistic determination, notwithstanding the Court’s 
disclaimers.24 In doing so, judges were to apply their “ judicial experience and 
common sense.” In light of the sparse factual and legal record on which district 
judges would be making a decision, this is an invitation for the exercise of judicial 
subjectivity, for judges to “fill in the gaps” of the truncated factual or legal record 
with what “they know” or, more significantly, what they think they know.
 But there is a more fundamental problem. Although much of the scholarly and 
practitioner literature that has discussed the implications of Iqbal for plaintiffs has 
focused on greater “fact pleading,” the judicial determination of plausibility is obviously 
both fact- and law-dependent. After Iqbal and Twombly, this pleading, the complaint, 
now has to bear the brunt of a very much heightened analysis on both fronts. 
Complaints have typically not been the place for elaborate factual narratives, much 
19. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
60 Duke L.J. 1, 4 (2010). 
20. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
21. Id.
22. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing approvingly to the standard imposed by the court 
below).
23. Id. at 678.
24. Id. at 680. To be sure, the Court denied that the new standard was a full “probability” standard, but it 
was surely moving in that direction: “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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less nuanced legal arguments. Complaints were not briefs; they were not supposed to 
be. They do not come close to a Rule 56 statement of facts, with all its limitations. To 
meet the new demands of Iqbal and Twombly, law and facts now have to be wedged 
into a document that in many instances is ill-suited for this kind of review.25
 Rule 12(b)(6) motions are now filed in almost every case and present a conundrum 
for judges. Since federal judges recognize that this is a preliminary stage, some judges 
will allow amendments of pleadings or early pre-dismissal discovery in order to assess 
the claims and see whether they should go forward. But many—too many, we 
believe—are dismissing the claims outright.
 Scholars who have analyzed the courts’ interpretations of Iqbal suggest that 12(b)(6) 
decisions are formulaic.26 If the complaint intones the “magic words” that spell out 
the factual elements of a claim in a way that is recognizable to the judge and the 
judge believes that the claim is “plausible,” the judge will allow the case to proceed.27 
Alternatively, the court will dismiss the case because of a lack of “factual specificity” 
and “conclusory allegations.”28 The law is rarely mentioned, unless there is a specific 
legal requirement on which the plaintiff is basing his or her claim that does not have 
a “factual hook” in the complaint. But the judge is necessarily applying the law as she 
understands it, in her assessment of the facts, in her understanding of which facts are 
salient and which are not, in her determination of what will or will not amount to 
proof in the case at bar. In a sense, the judge is ruling on the “law” implicit in the 
complaint, often without any explicit “law” or nuanced legal argument to go on.
 If the case survives the 12(b)(6) hurdle, discovery follows and, typically, a 
summary judgment motion. On summary judgment, the court will decide whether 
there are genuine and material disputes of fact, or whether the uncontested facts 
require judgment as a matter of law. The crucial difference between the 12(b)(6) 
stage and summary judgment is that there is a record for the latter—a factual record 
from discovery and a record of legal argument in the parties’ briefs.
 Whatever the problems with misuse of summary judgment, at the very least, 
legal and factual arguments are presented in a more complete, more contextual way 
than in litigation challenging the sufficiency of the complaint. In arguing either 
“fact” summary judgment (no genuine issues of material fact) or “law” summary 
judgment (the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law), the movant is 
integrating fact and law. And the non-movant must respond in a way that meets 
those arguments in their opposition papers.
 Although many scholars, including Professor Schneider, have criticized summary 
judgment on the grounds that judges are granting these motions and interpreting the 
25. A judge reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may consider documents incorporated into the complaint by 
reference and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Nevertheless, even as supplemented 
by these materials, the complaint is not an easy source of factual narrative or legal argument.
26. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and 
Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 Ky. L.J. 235 (2012); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to 
Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 Yale L.J. 2270 (2012).
27. See generally Brescia, supra note 26; Gelbach, supra note 26.
28. See generally Brescia, supra note 26; Gelbach, supra note 26.
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“reasonable juror” standard on problematic grounds, summary judgment 
decisionmaking, at the very least, engages the judge in a substantive law determination 
on a more complete record. The judge may be wrong or misguided. She may not 
really understand that she is effectively changing the legal rules, or that she is 
misreading the factual record. “Slicing and dicing” the record is often the name of 
the game in summary judgment decisionmaking, which skews the legal analysis.29 
Indeed, Judge Patricia Wald’s early concern with the way that summary judgment 
decisionmaking predominantly shapes federal jurisprudence applies with even greater 
force today.30 And because the law is now crafted at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and on 
an even sparser record, the results will be more problematic.
 Since Iqbal and Twombly, many commentators have noted the convergence 
between 12(b)(6) and summary judgment.31 Apparently, that was what the majority 
intended. But this has occurred at a critical point in the litigation, and based on a 
document that is fundamentally ill-suited for those purposes.
iV.  thE spECiaL prObLEMs Of thE sUbstantiVE LaW diMEnsiOns Of iQbaL in 
EMpLOYMEnt disCriMinatiOn CasEs
 The concerns that we have just outlined regarding Iqbal ’s plausibility standard in 
general are exacerbated in connection with employment discrimination claims. Title 
VII discrimination cases are about the defendant’s intent, asking whether, in the 
language of the statute, the defendant’s action was taken “because of ” “race, color 
religion, sex, or national origin.”32 The plaintiff ’s success typically depends upon what 
is in the defendant’s files, to which the plaintiff has little or no access before the litigation.
 In addition, the change effected by Iqbal is particularly troubling in employment 
discrimination cases for several reasons. First, there is little difference between the 
“common sense” and “plausibility” standards that Iqbal and Twombly encourage and the 
very cognitive processes that social scientists have identified as producing bias.33 A 
recent article on implicit bias in the courtroom suggests the problem that this emphasis 
on “ judicial experience and common sense” poses for 12(b)(6) decisionmaking in 
employment discrimination cases:
29. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 
Rutgers L. Rev. 705, 727 (2007); Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing and Dicing of Individual Disparate 
Treatment Law, 61 La. L. Rev. 577 (2001).
30. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1897 (1998).
31. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate 
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517 (2010); Suja A. 
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15 (2010).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
33. Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Implicit Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, in Implicit 
Racial Bias Across the Law 80 (2012).
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And when judges turn to their judicial experience and common sense, what 
will this store of knowledge tell them about whether some particular comment 
or act happened and whether such behavior evidences legally cognizable 
discrimination? Decades of social psychological research demonstrate that 
our impressions are driven by the interplay between categorical (general to 
the category) and individuating (specific to the member of the category) 
information. For example, in order to come to an impression about a Latina 
plaintiff, we reconcile general schemas for Latina workers with individualized 
data about the specific plaintiff. When we lack sufficient individuating 
information—which is largely the state of affairs at the motion to dismiss 
stage—we have no choice but to rely more heavily on our schemas.34
Without “sufficient individuating information” with respect to the case at hand, 
there is a risk that the judge’s “general schemas” about the plaintiff and who she is are 
likely to weigh heavily in the judge’s decisionmaking process. In short, in a 
discrimination case, perhaps even more than most, what is plausible to one judge 
may not be plausible to another.
 Second, these changes take place at a time of a change in attitudes about 
employment discrimination, which has already been widely noted by scholars and 
examined in summary judgment cases involving civil rights claims.35 The view 
reflected in recent decisions is that the United States is somehow “post-race bias” and 
even “post-gender bias.” The market functions rationally and is discrimination-free. 
The discrimination that is to be ferreted out in the law is discrimination involving 
the aberrant individual.36 The complex phenomenon that is discrimination can be 
reduced to a single paradigm—the errant discriminator or the explicit policy—
neither of which exists in twenty-first century real life.37 By this measure—looking 
for the “smoking guns” of discrimination—many discrimination complaints (not to 
mention summary judgment defenses) will fail.
34. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1160 (2012).
35. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 
96 Minn. L. Rev. 1275 (2012); Schneider, supra note 31; Schneider, supra note 29.
36. As one scholar put it,
courts view discrimination largely as “a problem of errant or rogue individual 
discriminators acting contrary to organizational policy and interest.” . . . In some cases, 
the search for the rogue actor . . . asks the wrong question about culpability. It ignores 
the fact that multi-tiered or group decisionmaking processes may make it difficult or 
impossible to locate intent within a particular person. . . . [It] disregards the ways that 
both formal and informal processes and policies within an organization shape the 
intentions and actions of its individual members, and the ways that the actions and 
intentions of the individual members shape the organization.
 Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 773, 787–88 
(2010).
37. Zimmer, supra note 29; see also Schneider, supra note 29.
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 Third, Iqbal and Twombly are likely to exacerbate what Judge Gertner has 
described as the phenomenon of “Losers’ Rules.”38 When a judge grants summary 
judgment, usually for the defendant, the court writes a decision. But when he or she 
denies summary judgment, he or she does not write an opinion; the case simply 
proceeds to trial. Over time, as Judge Gertner describes, “[i]f case after case recites 
the facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise that the decisionmakers 
have a hard time envisioning the facts that may well comprise discrimination. Worse, 
they may come to believe that most claims are trivial.”39
 Simple, pro-defendant heuristics evolve40 and are necessarily subject to systematic 
errors—false positives when the court finds that there may have been discrimination 
and there was not, or false negatives when a court finds no discrimination and there 
was. When courts believe that most claims are frivolous, they will be far more 
concerned with false positives—wrongful accusations of discrimination—not false 
negatives that leave claims of discrimination unredressed.
 Indeed, that is precisely what the Supreme Court was concerned about in Iqbal—
that defendants may well have been accused of a violation of rights when they had 
not done so, that they would feel compelled to settle cases that they should not to 
avoid discovery costs. Case management, it noted, had not proven sufficiently 
effective to control skyrocketing litigation costs.
 But the analysis is misplaced in this setting. While it was one thing to be 
concerned about the failures of case management in complex antitrust cases, it was 
another to be concerned about in connection with civil rights cases. As Professor 
Schneider’s work suggests, defendants in employment discrimination cases have been 
extraordinarily successful in ending litigation at summary judgment.41
 Fourth, the fact that the Iqbal/Twombly decisions take place on a truncated 
factual and legal record, in contrast to summary judgment proceedings, means that 
“Losers’ Rules” heuristics that have evolved in the summary judgment law are more 
likely to be applied and more likely to create false negatives—wrongly finding no 
discrimination. To be sure, the data on the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on Rule 
12(b)(6) in employment discrimination cases from the Federal Judicial Center and 
other scholars is highly contested.42 However while Iqbal and Twombly may not yet 
38. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 Yale L.J. Online 109 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/16/
gertner.html.
39. Id. at 115. 
40. Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 903 (2002).
41. Schneider, supra note 29, at 709.
42. See Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal: Report 
to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Federal Judicial Center 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.
pdf; Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal (Mar. 19, 2012) (Fed. Judicial Ctr., Working Paper 2012), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2026103; Brescia, supra note 26; Gelbach, supra note 26; Patricia W. 
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 553 (2010); 
Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions 
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have produced wholesale dismissal of employment discrimination complaints,43 given 
employment discrimination heuristics and precedent in other fields44 that is a fair 
prediction.45
 Indeed, even if cases are not dismissed at a higher rate, the Iqbal/Twombly 
analysis is likely to have a substantial impact on the subsequent “only procedural” 
rulings that a judge must make—the discovery that a court allows (for example, only 
discovery on the “plausible” claims), the class certification decision, and the efficacy 
of expert testimony. All these decisions will make summary judgment for the 
employer even more likely.
V. cOncLUsiOn: finAL thOUghts And fUrthEr WOrK
 It is important to recognize the substantive law dimensions of preliminary 
procedural decisions in federal civil cases because they are often subtle and allow 
back-door substantive revision of the law. Decisions based on Iqbal pose special 
problems in shaping and revising substantive law on a minimal record and even more 
serious problems in employment discrimination cases.
 But the issues that we have explored in this essay raise further questions as well, 
questions that we want to acknowledge even if we do not answer them here. What is 
to Dismiss, 2012 Fed. Cts. L. Rev 6, available at http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2010/Hoffman.
pdf.
43. Indeed, the summary judgment trilogy, which made summary judgment review more robust, came 
about precisely because of the limitations of notice pleading that the Court emphasized. And although, 
by all accounts, changes in summary judgment have had a substantial impact in employment 
discrimination cases, the Court is now justifying further changes because of deficiencies in the courts as 
gatekeepers, even at the Rule 56 stage.
44. The circuit courts are split on the continued application of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 
(2002). Compare Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d. 203, 211 (3d. Cir. 2009) (affirming the 
dismissal of a complaint; to the extent Swierkiewicz relies on Conley it is overruled) with Swanson v. 
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d. 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (overturning the dismissal of a complaint, noting 
the continued validity of Swierkiewicz, which was cited with approval in Twombly).
45. See, e.g., Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2012). Morales-Cruz was a well 
qualified law professor who sought a one-year extension of the probationary period before being 
considered for tenure. The complaint—less than elegantly drafted—outlined her qualif ications: 
outstanding performance and advanced degrees from Harvard Law School and the University of 
Oxford. But according to the complaint, she was denied the extension not because of issues with respect 
to her academic record, but because of her handling of one sexual harassment incident—failing to report 
that a male professor who co-taught with her had become romantically involved with a student. The 
discussions that ensued concerning the extension included comments about the plaintiff ’s “personality 
f laws,” inability to handle “complex and sensitive” situations, and referring to her as “that girl,” 
comments which she alleged involved gender stereotyping. Id. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal 
of the action on Iqbal grounds, announcing the “rule that stray remarks, without more, cannot ground a 
cause of action . . . in the gender-stereotyping context.” Id. at 226 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). First, while the record is sparse, as it inevitably is at a motion to dismiss, the 
accusations could well have suggested that the sexual harassment incident was a pretext for an adverse 
action against an otherwise qualified applicant or, at the very least, stated a claim for retaliation. Second, 
there is no “rule” with respect to “stray remarks,” and surely none in connection with gender stereotyping; 
gender stereotyping is all about such remarks. Gertner, supra note 38, at 119–20.
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the impact of the substantive law rulings that are part of these procedural 
determinations? Are they, for example, law of the case? Are they binding in some 
preclusive sense or are they purely dicta? If the substantive law is made, not only on 
summary judgment, but in 12(b)(6) motions, how will this change the nature of 
lawmaking in the federal courts? Does this back-door revision happen more in 
employment discrimination cases because the courts have come to see them as 
frivolous, or does it apply more generally to other disfavored claims?
 The bottom line is our concern that scholars, practitioners, and judges must 
recognize that these decisions are not “only procedural” and simply minimize their 
impact. To the contrary, these decisions can have an important, if unacknowledged, 
impact on the development of substantive law in general and in employment 
discrimination cases in particular.
